Firm Performance, Ownership Structure, and CEO Selection
The Case of Nigeria
Keywords:Blockholder, CEO Selection, Corporate, Performance, Connectedness, Nigeria
This paper attempts to examine the effect of ownership structures, corporate performance and board political connectedness on CEO selection. The sample of the study is all Nigerian non-financial firms from the year 2011 to 2015 consisting of 72 CEO selection events. This study uses logistic regression analysis to provide evidence that firms dominated with blockholder ownership favour external successors while managerial ownership-controlled firms are inclined to select internal candidates as successors. However, this study fails to support the argument that corporate performance and board political connectedness do influence the choice of CEO selection in the Nigerian public listed companies. In sum, the findings suggest that blockholders and managerial ownership significantly influence the choice of the origin of the successor CEOs in the Nigerian corporate landscape. This paper enriches the literature about CEO selection choices in developing economies with weak corporate governance structure like Nigeria. In addition, the findings from this study could be of immense benefit to the shareholders and corporate board members in making a decision on recruiting their CEOs; and the regulatory agencies in the formulation and enforcement of reforms that guarantee good corporate practices by the boards.
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